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TELLING THE STORY OF JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR 
 
Susan Frelich Appleton* 
 
 
 Two of the most noteworthy disclosures in Evan Thomas’s biography 
First: Sandra Day O’Connor came to light shortly before the book’s 
publication in March 2019.1 The previous October, a National Public Radio 
broadcast recounted how, as a law student at Stanford in the early 1950s, 
O’Connor received a marriage proposal from her classmate—and future 
Supreme Court colleague and Chief Justice—William Rehnquist.2 Also in 
October, O’Connor announced that she was stepping out of public life 
because of dementia, likely Alzheimer’s disease, the same mind-ravaging 
curse that afflicted her husband and prompted her to give up her seat on the 
Court prematurely so that she could care for him.3 One could easily regard 
the early release of such information as previews of the very personal study 
of O’Connor that the book aims to achieve, as conveyed by inviting 
language on its jacket: “An Intimate Portrait of the First Woman Supreme 
Court Justice.” 
 The promise of intimacy offers one path to follow through Thomas’s 
book. An additional path rests on O’Connor’s gender—which made her 
“first,” the most prominent word in the book’s title. In this review I travel 
both paths, ultimately showing how intimacy and gender in Thomas’s hands 
converge to raise disconcerting questions about the underpinnings of the 
entire project. 
 
*  Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. I thank 
colleagues Adrienne Davis, Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, and Karen Tokarz for valuable comments on 
an earlier draft. This book review is based on a shorter version that The Common Reader invited me to 
write and that it published in November 2019. See Susan Frelich Appleton, How One Glass Ceiling Was 
Broken, COMMON READER (Nov. 20, 2019), https://commonreader.wustl.edu/c/how-one-glass-ceiling-
was-broken/ [https://perma.cc/MAF4-FBBW]. 
1.  EVAN THOMAS, FIRST: SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR (Random House 2019). 
2.  Nina Totenberg, O'Connor, Rehnquist and a Supreme Marriage Proposal, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Oct. 31, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/10/31/662293127/a-supreme-marriage-proposal 
[https://perma.cc/LSD9-ZSP5]. 
3.  See Adam Liptak, Battling Dementia, Sandra Day O’Connor Leaves Public Life with Plea for 
Bipartisanship, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/dementia-sandra-day-supreme-
court.html?searchResultPosition=1 [https://perma.cc/XX8Z-9C6Z]. 











 To develop the promised intimacy, Thomas, like any good biographer, 
marries private and public. He recounts intersecting stories of O’Connor’s 
personal and professional trajectories, beginning with her girlhood on the 
Lazy B Ranch at the Arizona-New Mexico border4 to her college and law 
school days at Stanford5 to her stint in Arizona politics6 and as a state court 
judge there7 and on to her time on the United States Supreme Court.8 Along 
the way, he weaves in family milestones, individual challenges, and 
anecdotes about domestic and social life.  
 Although standard biographical fare, this melding serves a larger 
purpose here. As a jurist, O’Connor famously preferred narrow, context-
specific solutions to legal problems over definitive and widely applicable 
rules. One illustration that stands out is the notorious Bush v. Gore, which 
Thomas describes as “the most difficult and momentous case of her life.”9 
In this highly controversial intervention by the Supreme Court into the 2000 
presidential election, O’Connor did not merely vote with the majority in a 
per curiam (for the Court) opinion, which halted the Florida recount, thus 
handing the win to Bush. In addition, according to Thomas, she authored 
narrowing language designed to prevent the ruling and its rationale, based 
on the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, from ever having any 
application beyond this specific case: “Our consideration is limited to the 
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election 
processes generally presents many complexities.”10   
 This case typifies how O’Connor envisioned her judicial function as one 
of problem-solving. As she saw it, the contested election results posed a 
problem requiring a solution. Like all problems, however, this one had its 
own context and nuances, meriting a narrowly tailored response that would 
preserve flexibility for the future when new problems calling for different 
 
4.  THOMAS, supra note 1, at 3-24. 
5.  Id. at 25-46. 
6.  Id. at 71-100. 
7.  Id. at 101-120. 
8.  Id. at 121-384. 
9.  Id. at 333. 
10.  Id. at 332; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000). Those familiar with the Anglo-American 
judicial tradition, with its reliance on precedent, appreciate how this disclaimer represented a jarring 















solutions would arise. Thomas explains, and the legal literature documents, 
that these hallmarks—nuance, attention to context, limited application, and 
flexibility11—can be found in many cases in which O’Connor played a 
decisive role, including those on abortion, religion, and affirmative action. 
Of course, this approach not only earned O’Connor the title of “pragmatist,” 
but also made her the target of criticism, including especially fierce 
condemnation by some of her Supreme Court colleagues, who claimed she 
was just postponing important questions for another day while depriving the 
lower courts of much needed guidance.12 
 Consistent with the book jacket’s promise of intimacy, Thomas explains 
how Bush v. Gore also exemplifies the seamless way in which O’Connor’s 
personal and professional lives intertwined. Precisely because of her vote 
that made Bush the President, she felt that she could not retire during his 
first term—despite her plan before the election.13 So, she soldiered on, while 
feeling pulled to care for her husband whose dementia was worsening; then, 
she later found herself, perhaps naively, relying on her one-time beau Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s insistence that she could retire because he would not, 
only to learn subsequently that he had not disclosed the extent of his own 
health problems, which caused his death in office shortly after she stepped 
down. Thomas explores these crosscurrents while also widening the lens to 
document how O’Connor’s judicial clerks appreciated that their work with 
her encompassed so much more than legal research and writing. Rather, in 
the words of one, they were all taking part in “not just an apprenticeship in 
law but an apprenticeship in life.”14 This was particularly and poignantly so 
when, toward the end of her time on the Court, her husband John O’Connor 
would spend the day in her chambers so she could attend to his needs and 
comfort him with her presence.15  
 
 
11.  THOMAS, supra note 1, at 315. 
12.  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346-49 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (criticizing the approach to affirmative action in Justice O’Connor’s majority 
opinion); see also, e.g., THOMAS, supra note 1, at 361-62 (recounting friction between O’Connor and 
Scalia over this case). 
13.  THOMAS, supra note 1, at 333-34. As Thomas explains, given O’Connor’s interest in having a 
Republican president appoint her successor, she felt that taking advantage of one whom  “she had helped 
put in the White House would be unseemly—unattractive, as she used the word in its deepest meaning.” 
Id. at 333.  
14.  Id. at 295. 
15.  Id. at 366. 











 Even if my summary above provides a glimpse of the “intimate portrait” 
that Thomas seeks to present, it fails to capture explicitly what the most 
prominent part of the biography’s title communicates, namely O’Connor’s 
“firstness.” As Thomas suggests, the quotidian aspects of O’Connor’s life, 
from girlhood on, become especially meaningful because of her pioneering 
role as the first woman to sit on the United States Supreme Court. 
 Because O’Connor’s “firstness” projects its shadow on everything, 
gender necessarily looms large, and yet Thomas’s treatment struck me as 
thin and unsatisfying. Certainly, Thomas devotes considerable attention to 
O’Connor’s felt conflicts as wife and mother, her apparent guilt about 
uprooting her husband from Arizona,16 and her admonitions to her clerks to 
prioritize their families.17 He also flags her stereotypically female 
commitment to connectedness and collegiality, with her insistence that the 
Justices have lunch together regularly,18 and he recounts how she warmly 
welcomed Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Court in 1993.19 In addition, of 
course, Thomas highlights O’Connor’s gender jurisprudence, laying out 
how she decided and wrote opinions in cases about sex discrimination and 
abortion in particular.20 Along the way, Thomas takes pains to acknowledge 
that O’Connor paid especially close attention to the facts of cases when they 
“involved women and children,”21 and he asserts that “[w]ithout question, 
her experience as a woman, daughter, wife, mother—and now 
grandmother—influenced her jurisprudence.”22 
 Still, I wanted more. As I read Thomas’s approach, he would pin my 
dissatisfaction on O’Connor herself and her own conception and 
performance of gender. Compared to Ginsburg, outspoken foe of sex 
discrimination and now pop-culture feminist icon affectionately known as 
“the notorious RBG,”23 O’Connor took a more understated approach, 
 
16.  Id. at 375, 378. 
17.  Id. at 209. 
18.  Id. at 274-75. 
19.  Id. at 286-87. 
20.  Id. at 278-81, 316-18. 
21.  Id. at 316. 
22.  Id. at 268. 
















although both began their illustrious careers precisely the same way: unable 
to get a law firm job because none would hire a woman, despite their stellar 
law school records.24 From Thomas’s treatment, O’Connor’s more modest, 
even skeptical, approach came from the self-reliance she developed on the 
Lazy B Ranch,25 and it reflected less a matter of strategy than her matter-of-
fact way of moving forward in life to pursue the “real-world solutions” that 
she preferred, both on the Court and off.26  Thomas writes, building on 
quotations from former clerk Kent Syverud about her views of sex and race 
discrimination: “She disliked victimhood and identity politics. ‘She was 
very annoyed about the idea of a “woman’s point of view,”’ said Syverud. 
‘She had a lot of experience of her own to know that the playing field was 
not always level, but she disliked explicit recognitions of race.’”27 So, I 
imagine that Thomas would claim to be just telling it, as they say, “like it 
is”—and as any other author would have as well.  
 Yet, I detected elisions and oversimplifications that I suspect other 
authors, especially those more attuned to gender and feminist jurisprudence, 
might well have avoided. Two examples help make my point. First, 
although Justice O’Connor is certainly entitled to reject the label 
“feminist,”28 it would have been easy to note how her pragmatic and 
context-sensitive approach to deciding cases tracks a methodology that 
feminist legal theorists call “feminist practical reasoning.”29 Indeed, 
Thomas comes so close when he writes: “by judging in her one-case-at-a-
 
24.  THOMAS, supra note 1, at 285. 
25.  See id. at 342. 
26.  Id. at 313. 
27.  Id. at 347. 
28.  Id. at 267. 
29.  E.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 849-63 (1990). 
Bartlett introduces this methodology as follows:  
Some feminists have claimed that women approach the reasoning process 
differently than men do.  In particular, they say that women are more sensitive to 
situation and context, that they resist universal principles and generalizations, 
especially those that do not fit their own experiences, and that they believe that 
“the practicalities of everyday life” should not be neglected for the sake of abstract 
justice. Whether these claims can be empirically sustained, this reasoning process 
has taken on normative significance for feminists, many of whom have argued 
that individualized factfinding is often superior to the application of bright-line 
rules, and that reasoning from context allows a greater respect for difference and 
for the perspectives of the powerless. . . . 
Id. at 849 (footnotes omitted). 
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time fashion—by looking closely at the facts and broader social context—
she did bring a uniquely female perspective: her own.”30 He could have 
enriched this analysis with a brief reference to feminist legal methodologies, 
adding force and complexity to O’Connor’s supposed rejection of the idea 
that women decide cases differently and her clerks’ reported bewilderment 
“at her lack of self-awareness.”31  
Second, the biography includes only the skimpiest mention of 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in J.E.B. v. Alabama,32 when—again—
situating it in feminist jurisprudence would have provided a deeper view of 
the significance of gender to O’Connor. Thomas’s full treatment of the case 
consists of two sentences: 
In a 1994 case ruling that a state criminal court not exclude 
female jurors [sic], O’Connor wrote: “one need not be a 
sexist to share the intuition that in certain cases a person’s 
gender and resulting experience will be relevant to his or 
her view of the case.” Gender, she declared, should make 
no difference as a “matter of law”—but that didn’t mean 
that gender made no difference as a “matter of fact.”33  
He might have said more, however, especially because this small slice 
of J.E.B. both seems at odds with the Syverud quotation above about 
O’Connor’s refusal to embrace a “woman’s point of view” and also reveals 
subtlety in how O’Connor approached cases about “women and children.” 
Accordingly, it’s worth noting that J.E.B. arose from a criminal prosecution 
for paternity and child support.34 The majority held unconstitutional the 
state’s use of peremptory challenges to strike male jurors (not female jurors, 
as Thomas’s summary claims); O’Connor joined that majority opinion,35 
but she went on to write a separate concurring opinion for herself alone.36 
A leading treatise on feminist legal theory cites the majority’s approach as 
exemplifying the influence on the law of liberal feminism with its 
commitment to formal equal treatment.37 This treatise goes on to observe 
 
30.  THOMAS, supra note 1, at 268. 
31.  Id. at 268. See also id at 351. 
32.  511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
33.  THOMAS, supra note 1, at 268. 
34.  J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129. 
35.  Id. at 127. 
36.  Id. at 146. 















how O’Connor’s separate concurrence pushed back on formal equality.38 A 
longer quotation from that solo opinion offers telling language to 
supplement Thomas’s abbreviated summary, suggesting that O’Connor 
shared some ideas characteristic of a different school of feminist thought, 
namely relational or cultural feminism:39 
Nor is the value of the peremptory challenge to the litigant 
diminished when the peremptory is exercised in a gender-
based manner. We know that like race, gender matters. A 
plethora of studies make clear that in rape cases, for 
example, female jurors are somewhat more likely to vote to 
convict than male jurors. Moreover, though there have been 
no similarly definitive studies regarding, for example, 
sexual harassment, child custody, or spousal or child abuse, 
one need not be a sexist to share the intuition that in certain 
cases a person’s gender and resulting life experience will 
be relevant to his or her view of the case. . . . Individuals 
are not expected to ignore as jurors what they know as 
men—or women.40 
Of course, authors must make choices, and biographers cannot include 
every detail. Indeed, I don’t contend that Thomas should have been writing 
this book for feminist legal theorists. Nonetheless, these examples helped 
me in my own effort to make more concrete the nagging sense I had 




My incipient skepticism about Thomas’s sensitivity to and appreciation 
of gender dynamics coalesced as I finished reading the text and turned to 
the acknowledgments, which begin on page 407 with the following 
paragraph: 
My wife, Oscie, was essential to this book. We conducted 
almost every interview together, and she spent many hours 
 
38.  Id. at 47. 
39.  See id. at 65-72; see also id. at 22 (explaining cultural feminism’s emphasis on women’s 
differences from men, specifically the greater value that they tend to ascribe to relationships and 
connection over autonomy). 
40.  511 U.S. at 148-49 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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with me reading documents in Justice O’Connor’s 
chambers at the Supreme Court and in the Madison 
Building reading room of the Library of Congress. We 
talked about the book constantly, and she worked over 
every word of the manuscript. We traveled together to visit 
the justice in Phoenix and to speak with Justice O’Connor’s 
clerks and friends in many places around the country. Oscie 
has been deeply involved in most of my books as an editor 
and coresearcher, but this one is different. She understood 
Justice O’Connor in ways that I could not. The portrait here 
is the work of two people who have grown ever closer over 
the years. It is a joint project and a labor of love.41  
True, on one reading, this paragraph might assure readers that, thanks 
to Thomas’s close collaboration with his wife, a “woman’s point of view” 
informed the book, despite O’Connor’s claimed rejection of such 
perspective. This understanding brings to mind how Washington 
University’s famous sex researcher William Masters succeeded in 
incorporating women’s interests and bringing women subjects into his 
studies thanks to his collaboration with Virginia Johnson, who later became 
his wife.42 
 Yet, for me, this paragraph stood out as a red flag, prompting a more 
mistrustful reaction—although I know nothing about the relationship of 
Thomas and his wife, beyond what he writes here, and I have no sense of 
her preferences. I found the paragraph both deeply heartfelt and shockingly 
myopic, raising several questions: Why doesn’t the book’s authorship 
include both names or at least say “Evan Thomas with Oscie ___”?  (We 
don’t even learn Oscie’s full name.)  After all, William Masters gave 
Virginia Johnson coauthor credit for their books and they became known as 
a team: “Masters and Johnson.”43 Why did Thomas wait more than four 
hundred pages to acquaint readers with his wife’s significant role?  
 
41.  THOMAS, supra note 1, at 407. 
42.  See Susan Ekberg Stiritz & Susan Frelich Appleton, “Money Can’t Buy Me Love”: Sex Therapy 
in the Age of Viagra, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 363, 367-68 (2011) (citing THOMAS MAIER, MASTERS 
OF SEX: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM MASTERS AND VIRGINIA JOHNSON, THE COUPLE WHO 
TAUGHT AMERICA HOW TO LOVE (2009)). 
43.  E.g., WILLIAM H. MASTERS & VIRGINIA E. JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE (1966); see Sex 















 Try as I might, after reading this belated disclosure, I could not help 
thinking of two recent films: The Wife, the fictional story of a husband who 
receives the Nobel Prize in Literature for work secretly authored by his 
wife,44 and Colette, a historical drama about the French novelist who began 
her career as a ghostwriter for her domineering husband, a pretender who 
achieved success based on her unacknowledged talents and labor.45 These 
comparisons are no doubt too harsh, and a more apt and forgiving recent-
film reference might be Life Itself, in which the “unreliable narrator” 
operates as a plot device, not only by playing an explicit role as the subject 
matter of the thesis that one character is writing, but also by implicitly 
challenging viewers to discern “truth” in developments presented from the 
perspectives of different narrators.46  
 By the end, the book left me puzzling over several questions about the 
author, diverting attention from the Justice herself: How reliable a narrator 
is Thomas in telling her story? How did Thomas’s own intimate relationship 
color his “intimate portrait”? How confident can readers feel that Thomas 
captured and presented a full picture of O’Connor, especially when it comes 





 In 1869, Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins came to Washington 
University as the nation’s first women law students and its first women 
baccalaureate students.47 I write this review of First in 2019 from my perch 
at Washington University, where I hold the Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe 
Couzins professorship and where we have been spending the year 
celebrating the 150th anniversary of the arrival of these pathbreaking 
women, who cleared the way for so many who followed across the nation, 
 
MILTON FRIEDMAN, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962) 
(illustrating another style for acknowledging such contributions). 
44.  THE WIFE (Sony Pictures 2017). 
45.  COLETTE (Bleecker Street 2018). 
46.  LIFE ITSELF (Amazon 2018). 
47.  Karen Tokarz, A Tribute to the Nation’s First Women Law Students, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 89 
(1990). According to a history of the University, “the law school was the first baccalaureate division of 
the University to admit women and perhaps the first of its kind in the country to do so.”  RALPH E. 
MORROW, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS: A HISTORY 57 (1996).   
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including Justice O’Connor. We have been telling many stories about 
Lemma Barkeloo and Phoebe Couzins, although without claiming the 
intimacy that Thomas’s book strives to achieve.  
Against this background, First offers an all too familiar but still important 
cautionary tale:  we must take care not to accept such stories purely on their 
own terms, but always to keep in mind the entire context, including the 
inextricable role of the storytellers themselves. In telling the stories of 
Lemma Barkeloo, Phoebe Couzins, and Sandra Day O’Connor, we are also 
revealing something about ourselves. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol62/iss1/8
